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History of Emigration from Hungary
Castles (2015) states that migration is a collective action arising out of social, economic,
and political change affecting the whole society in both sending and receiving areas. These
reasons often overlap making it difficult to separate economic from social, cultural, and political
reasons. Since the end of WWII Europe has become a migration destination. This was caused by
decolonization, rapid economic growth, and the EU becoming a free trade and migration zone
particularly in Western Europe. Emigration of highly skilled people is a problem more or less
across the EU, it is worth noting that there is an important difference in Hungary. Western
Europe is challenged by the threat of their professionals moving to the USA as the latter offers
an almost unmatched mix of money, research personnel concentration, and meritocracy.
However, if we look at Eastern Europe and in this case Hungary, apparently not only the USA
seems to have this kind of pulling attractiveness but also some Western European countries,
predominately the Benelux states, UK, and Germany.
Személyi (2011) states that, traditionally, emigration waves occur during or immediately
after large crises or changes in the society of the origin country. There is only one exception in
the case of Hungary: the transformation of the political system in 1989. The early to mid-1990s
saw a new labor frontier for Western Europe with the newly former USSR satellites, including
Hungary. However, emigration actually decreased throughout the 1990s. This can at least
partly be attributed to the euphoria of the people anticipating the hopefully upcoming freedom
and social wealth. However, emigration rose for skilled people due to later changes in laws. The
significant outflows from Eastern Europe heading west during this time were largely of ethnic
minorities to homelands or safer areas. For Hungary, this was the minority Roma population
moving West. However, Hungary was also considered one of the more stable former Warsaw
Pact countries and it received many migrants hoping to use Hungary as a transit country as well,
due to its border with Austria. Since Hungary itself was still forming a new government at this
time, they were unprepared for immigration as they had no offices or laws addressing the
subject. According to Düvell (2014) in 1994 there were up to 2 million migrants in Central
Europe, mostly in Hungary, wanting to move west. A lot of attention was paid to migrants
wanting to use Hungary as a transit country at the time for both regular and irregular migration
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since these migrants stood out ethnically since in addition to Balkan migrants Hungary received
many Afghan migrants looking to move west. This triggered biased investigations into transit
migration at the time. Many of these migrants are thought to have been set on moving on from
Hungary due to Hungary’s homogenous cultural and difficult language as well as increasing antiimmigration policies and views. Specific numbers within Hungary are unknown; however,
emigration of both citizens and refugees is still thought to be higher than immigration
throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s.
Galgóczi (2013) notes that the early 2000s saw another boom in migration out of
Hungary to Western Europe. Short-term migration, long-term foreign employment, and
emigration potential all rose significantly from the early to mid-2000s. With Hungary joining the
EU in 2004, emigration increased significantly and reached an unprecedented high in 2005
despite restrictions from Western EU countries which expired completely in 2011. After a drop
in emigration in 2006, this rate along with long-term foreign employment, remained constant
near early 2000s levels until 2008. However, short-term migration had decreased. Any
underlying long-term trend will be upset by unique discrete events or shocks. For example, the
worldwide global economic crisis (2007-2010) in the words of the OECD (2012). Hungary
experienced a strong spike in emigration in 2008 likely due to the shock of the global economic
crisis. Since 2010 (end of the global economic crisis), the emigration of the highly skilled has
increased considerably once again and the number of those intending to emigrate permanently
and those emigrating permanently is at an all-time high and increasing year after year. This
coincides with the Fidesz party coming to power and staying there ever since. A lot of increase
in emigration and emigration intentions is not considered to be due to economic reasons
despite Hungary’s worsening economic position but rather political reasons. 2015 hit a new alltime high in terms of both total emigration and educated emigration of Hungarian citizens as
well as immigration and emigration of refugees. Hungary occupies a unique position with
respect to refugees in the sense that it was heavily involved in the 2015 refugee crisis, yet the
country became a frontline country without any immigrants. Juhász (2017) notes that in 2015,
391,384 irregular migrants and 177,135 legal asylum seekers entered Hungary. This was up
314% from previous year, but most were seeking to head west. Asylum-seekers submitted
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applications in Hungary only for formal reasons and, almost without exception, they all moved
on to Western Europe afterwards, Germany being their primary destination. By the end of
2015, only between 900 and 1,000 refugees stayed in Hungary. Half of them were in detention
centers and were unable to leave, and most of the other half had already started immigration
procedures. Many left due to financial reasons and the homogenous culture of Hungary.
Since the fall of communism in Hungary, the reasons for educated emigration have
largely remained the same. According to Személyi (2011) a 2005 study, that was reproduced in
2008, on the demographics of Hungarian emigrants, one quarter of survey respondents had
degrees in at least two science fields, 10% had educational qualification higher than PhD, and
4% were members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. These emigrants said they left due to
the limited job market in Hungary for professionals in the natural and technical sciences,
especially in R&D. As to the overall motivation structure of emigrants, the results in 2008 were
the same as in 2005: the main push factor is income, but professional development/career
opportunities, and the overall political situation in Hungary are also significant. At the
destination countries they usually find what they felt they needed: satisfaction in current job is
higher in every respect than it was in Hungary. Additionally, in 2008 75% of emigrants said they
settled for the long term, which was up from 60% in 2005.

According to Szilasi & Halász (2018) a 2013 study found that in the case of Hungarians,
predominantly economic and political, and to a lesser extent socio-cultural and geographic-
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historical factors explain the strengthening of emigration. Due to current demographic erosion,
decline in the number of births, social, educational and health care deficiencies, the future
consolidation of the pension system, the growing proportion of deprived social groups, exodus
of rural population and more, the current and the future situation will likely become worse due
to the fact as the most affected age groups are getting younger. The average age of emigrants is
29/30 years old. According to data from Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (KSH), The Hungarian
Central Statistical Office, 44% of migrants are under 30 years old and 77% are under 40. KSH
also noted in 2013 that Hungarian students attending Hungarian universities and colleges
decreased by 25% during the last decade. These students acquire their first work experience in
host countries, continuing their socialization in an inclusive and multicultural social
environment, establish long lasting social networks, advance their foreign language and
interpersonal competences and all these attributes reinforce their migration potential even for
a lifetime. Growing dissatisfaction with education policy and the social welfare system as well
as uncertainty about the future are all motivational sources that intensify migration.
Additionally, the macroeconomic situation of the country, the stagnant GDP since 2010, the
increasing inter- and intra-regional inequalities caused by maldistribution of the social systems,
the low level of average wages on the individual level, the enormous levels of debts burdening
predominantly low and medium social strata groups, and the lack of savings are considered as
the most crucial components leading towards emigration.

As mentioned in the table above, economic, and financial reasons are both the top push
and pull factors for Hungarian emigrants. Saphier & Simonovits (2004) investigated Hungary’s
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Project Retour. Project Retour dealt with return migrants from 2003-2009, primarily through
assisting the migrants in finding a job and reintegrating into the Hungarian scientific and skilled
worker community but also by involving themselves in some social research and conference
activities on the matter. It was the first organization who asked the migrants and some
returners about their opinions and reasons behind leaving Hungary and coming back. This
research was not intended to be scientific, and it was not published but instead posted on the
website of Project Retour. Their methodology was based on a questionnaire made available on
the website of the organization as for a couple of months in 2004 and the respondent could
send it filled in as an attachment to an email address. They had 120 respondents, half of them
were still living outside Hungary while the other half were returnees. Their conclusion was that
the main factors were financial reasons and lack of career opportunities. Galgóczi (2013) states
that wages in the UK, a top destination for educated Hungarian emigrants, are 3.3 times higher
than those in Hungary. Additionally, wages are 2.8 times higher in Germany and Austria and 2.4
times higher in Ireland.
Due to the increasing wage gap between Hungary and Western European countries as
well as what many educated Hungarians view as a worsening political situation, so migration
intentions are changing. Szilasi & Halász (2018) notes that a 2011 study asked, “Are you
planning to go abroad for a year or two in the next two or three years?” Around 43% of
respondents said they had no intention of emigrating, around 37% said they had some
intention of emigration, and around 19% said they had serious intention to emigrate.
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The study also notes that women’s participation in is rising rapidly compared to previous
periods. This is due to changes in the social judgment and involvement of women, their
individual careers, labor market status, family expectation, and network expansions.
Historically, there has been a persistent gap between worker’s social situations in
Western and Eastern Europe. The fall of communism and move towards democracy has not
helped or even worsened the gap in some cases. According to Bohle (2006) the unemployment
rate in the West in the early 1990s was 9.2% while it was 10.3% in the Visegrád Group, which
includes Hungary, and Slovenia; however, the rate in the mid-1990s to early 2000s was 7.5% in
the West and 11.6% in Visegrád and Slovenia. Additionally, Eastern Europeans work longer
hours for less wages on average. These workers have less bargaining power and social
collectives.
The consensus on reasons for emigration from Hungary is that financial and economic
reasons are the top push and pull factors. This is especially true for educated emigrants as their
wage potential abroad, particularly in Western and Northern Europe, is more than twice their
wage potential in Hungary. In response to this, the Hungarian government has started
programs both to increase return migrants and financially aid the highly educated so they will
stay in Hungary.

Government Response
Valkó (2016) notes that since the end of the USSR, the government has largely had a
policy of denying the issue of emigration publicly. Modern politicians have either denied that
mass emigration occurs at all, contradicting data or stated that emigration is a good thing for
Hungary. András Giró-Szász, Secretary of State for communications at the Office of the Prime
Minister, said “first of all, there is no such thing [in Hungary] as emigration; what it is, is the
freedom to work anywhere in the EU. [A person] takes up a job in an EU member state, but [his
or her] family lives here at home, [he or she] transfers the money earned there, they remit
more than two billion euros a year, and significantly contribute to the Hungarian national
economy, and this does not cause any tension whatsoever”. He also stated, “These numbers
are incorrect, the claim that emigration rates have increased since 2010 is false, the majority of
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these people left before 2010 and this does not cause any problems whatsoever”. However,
data contradicts the claim that emigration rates have not increased since 2010. Prime Minister
Viktor Orban, who came to power in 2010, has made many statements on how emigration is
beneficial for Hungary. He stated that: “[Emigrants] do no wrong whatsoever to their home
country, and moreover, within one year they send home amounts worth two billion
euros...these people should be thanked!”. He has also denied the existence of emigration at all
when he said “It is absurd to speak of emigration from Hungary to Germany or the United
Kingdom. These people are not emigrants, because we ourselves wanted to create one
common economic realm in which people are free to take jobs anywhere”. However behind
closed doors the government has worked to examine why skilled emigrants leave, prevent
skilled emigration, and increase the return rate of skilled emigrants.
Gyere Haza Fiatal, translated as “Come Home Young Person”, was a program run by the
Országos Foglalkoztatási Közhasznú Non-profit KFT – OFA (National Employment Foundation)
from April of 2015 to June of 2016. It targeted young Hungarian professionals living in the
United Kingdom and aided in moving back home and finding a suitable job in Hungary. It was
specifically directed towards young people living in London, because in this city, the average
age of Hungarian professionals is the lowest, and the average education level the highest. The
process of the program was simple for applicants. First one would register online, then they
would be interviewed and his or her background and skills were assessed by a representative
from the OFA, then an interview with a representative of the prospective employer involved in
the initiative would occur, and finally the person would return home with costs of this move
covered by the OFA. Additionally, if accepted into the programme then a person would receive
a monthly allowance of HUF 100,000 (EUR 325) for the duration of one year, to cover
accommodation costs (or a part thereof) or travel expenses if the distance was over 100
kilometers or the commute took more than 5 hours back and forth. Sándor Czomba, Secretary
of State for Employment in the Ministry of National Economic Affairs at the time stated that
40,000 people had already signed up for the program after a few weeks. However, it quickly
turned out that Czomba’s conclusion was wrong as the Facebook page for the website had
been ‘liked’ by 202 people, and the total reach of the Facebook page amounted to 40,000. The
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ministry later rectified Czomba’s statement and stated that while the Facebook page had
reached 40,000 people, by that time 581 people had registered for information on the website.
By end of programme over 2,000 jobs were waiting to be filled in 134 partnering companies,
105 Hungarians had returned from the UK, and the entire budget of HUF 100 mill (EUR 300,000)
was not spent. The initial aim of the policy was to have 50 Hungarian professionals return and
with 105 returns this goal was surpassed. Yet it remains to be seen whether the return of 105
professionals to the Hungarian labor market will have a significant and lasting influence on the
overall economy.
Röghöz kötés, meaning serfdom, name given by critics of part of the education reform in
the fourth amendment of the Hungarian constitution. Starting in 2012, prospective students at
a Hungarian institute of higher education who want to apply for a government-funded place are
required to sign an agreement obligating them, within 20 years of completing their studies, to
work in Hungary for a period that is the same duration as their studies. If they fail to do so, they
must pay back the financial aid to the state. This was heavily criticized because it does not
improve the education system which would encourage staying, it simply inhibits people from
leaving. However, it is in theory a voluntary decision as to accept the financial aid. Rózsa
Hoffman, Secretary of State for Public Education from 2013 to 2014, insisted that they “were
not binding anyone to the land” and the agreement in question was “based on a voluntary
decision”. However, Hallgatói Önkormányzatok Országos Konferenciája (HÖOK), the National
Union of Hungarian Students, has argued that the measure violates people’s fundamental
rights. Additionally, others have agreed with Diána Szekeres (2013) who raised the question as
to whether this student agreement can really be considered a civil law agreement concluded
since a truly voluntary decision as the state and the student are not equal entities. She also
notes that decreasing educated emigration should be done through policy work to improve
their economic condition and employment opportunities and that this policy could drive young
people away sooner as they could choose to become educated abroad instead. Similar to this
policy are the Markusovszky and Than Károly Schemes. These programs are for doctors and
pharmacists, respectively. Participants receive a monthly stipend of HUF 100,000 (EUR 325) for
the duration of their residency/special training on the condition that they do not accept
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gratuity money and agree to stay in full employment in Hungary after completion of their
residency for a period of equal length.
While the government publicly denies the issue of brain drain, their policies state
otherwise. Hosting return programs for young, educated emigrants and programs to aid in the
funding of higher education on the condition that the person stay indicate the Hungarian
government is aware of their brain drain problem. As shown by their specific programs for
those in medical training, the brain drain problem is particularly true for their scientific
community. What kind of problems and benefits can be caused by brain drain?

Brain Drain Theories
Early brain drain literature, pre-1990s, showed how brain drain is detrimental for the
sender countries and benefits are rare and/or counteracted. This is true of Bhagwati & Hamada
(1974). Bhagwati & Hamada (1974) state that if the government of a sender country has
financed the education of an emigrant that it planned on recuperating in taxes, then the lack of
recuperation results in a reduction in welfare for either or both the educated and uneducated
labor depending on changes in national income, per capita income, and unemployment. They
analyze three cases:
In the first case, migration does not have an impact on expected wages or national
income in the sender country, but per capita income is increased. If emigration increases the
per capita income of the emigrants as well, then the brain drain is beneficial for the sender
country. In the second case, if in the sender country wages of only the educated rise then the
wage demand of the educated will rise as well. This will reduce the employment level of high
skilled workers. The national income of the sender country has not changed in this case,
however; educated workers are demanding higher wages so less are employed in order to meet
wage demands. In the third case, since the sender country’s wages for the uneducated workers
rose too then they will have increased wage demand and reduced employment as well. This
increase in wage demands from the uneducated may result in a decreasing supply of educated
workers in the sender country since workers may no longer view and education as essential.
Therefore, the national income of the sender country will increase since the cost of education
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to the government will decrease; however, this is counteracted by a reduction in output caused
by decreasing skill levels and lower employment. Overall, the sender country’s national income
will decrease most of the time in this case.
Miyagiwa (1991) agrees with and adds to the third case of Bhagwati & Hamada (1974). It
states that brain drain can cause a decline in the country’s national income due to changes in
wage demands and employment levels. It adds that it may also have a highly inequitable
income distributional effect on the population of the origin country, especially upon the
individuals who have intermediate abilities (secondary educated). The emigration of skilled
workers will hurt mostly the skilled workers who did not emigrate through lower employment,
while unskilled workers would be relatively less affected. It also notes that though knowledge
created by emigrants and possibly enhanced through agglomeration and spillover can be used
by origin countries like Hungary, it is not free or easy to access. It is limited geographically,
culturally, and linguistically.
More modern brain drain theories both continue to show the detriments of brain drain,
but also show how brain drain can improve a country’s institutions and that knowledge created
abroad can be used in a sending country.
Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997) argued that the possibility of a successful
international career is an incentive for the people to study, therefore in an origin country there
will be more highly qualified people if brain drain exists than if not and they designated this
process with the new term “brain gain”.
Beine et al. (2003) used data on migration rates by educational level, in order to provide
empirical evidence for the beneficial brain drain hypothesis at an aggregate level. They found
that migration prospects have a positive effect on human capital formation. Countries
experiencing a beneficial brain drain are those that combine low levels of human capital with
low skilled migration rates; however, more countries experiencing a detrimental brain drain
rather than a beneficial one. The countries that experience beneficial brain drain are
demographically the largest, i.e., China.
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Faini (2003) studied the effects of skilled migration, remittances, and education. The
author states that there is not strong evidence to conclude that raising the skill level of
emigrants is beneficial for education in origin countries because many emigrants had decided to
be educated abroad. So, there is no lost investment from funding the education of many
migrants since they are not educated in the origin country, but this also means there is less
incentive to invest in education. Additionally, skilled migrants have lower remittances so there
is little capital transfer from them. This causes them to have little effect on the demand side of
their origin country’s economy.
Poutvaara (2004) also focuses on the education aspect of the brain drain. It states that
since the possibility of migration provides incentive to invest in education in the origin country
thus improving the education in the origin country, an increasing number of students have the
tendency to opt for internationally applicable educations to emigrate in the future. Due to this
individual governments in the EU are changing the provision of public education from
internationally applicable education towards country-specific skills. However, those countries
may end up having too many skilled workers in one field and not enough in another. For
example, a country could end up with too many lawyers and too few doctors.
Groizard and Llull (2006) examined GDP growth and skilled migration in 170 countries,
and they showed in a regression that a 10% higher brain drain correlates with 0.8% lower GDP
growth on average. Additionally, they disproved Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz’s hypothesis
of ‘brain gain’: in the countries experiencing a higher brain drain, the ratio of tertiary educated
people is not higher.
Docquier and Bhargava (2007) acknowledge the fact that general emigration rates may
hide significant occupational shortages, for example among engineers and doctors. In many
developing countries shortages are particularly severe in the medical sector. It analyzed data on
doctors with foreign qualifications working in the OECD countries from 1991-2004 and
computed medical emigration rates. The results showed that even if some countries exhibited
moderate total emigration rates, they suffered from significant medical brain drain.
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Docquier (2012) evaluated the impact of emigration in OECD countries, including
Hungary, in the 1990s on the employment and wage levels of the workers who did not
emigrate. It found that emigration caused a wage decline for the uneducated worker and was a
part of increases in inequality within all OECD countries.
Docquier (2014), however, found that emigration helps improve the institutions in origin
countries, like Hungary, and that emigration to more liberal democracies has mainly positive
implications in institutional and political change in the developing countries. Emigration
increases the origin country’s exposure to new, and generally more liberal, political ideas and
practices through return migrants and diaspora networks. This is a part of knowledge transfer.
While human capital is not freely available to everyone since ownership rights make it possible
to exclude those not willing to pay for it through employment, knowledge can be used by
anyone in the world for no cost or a very low marginal cost, aside from ideas protected by
property rights. So, a sending country can use ideas from their own emigrants. New knowledge
being used has increasing returns to scale for the economy. However, there are local limitations
to the dispersion of knowledge. Knowledge and ideas are dispersed in groups, so a ‘coreperiphery’ divide occurs. This causes the highly skilled to emigrate from underdeveloped
‘periphery’ countries and regions to the higher developed ‘core’ regions, where they gain from
an over-proportional income increase whereas the “periphery” regions lose income potential.
Therefore, disparity is enlarged. This means that capital stays away, and average productivity is
low, and people are encouraged to emigrate once again. It is a vicious cycle.
The majority of these theories utilize collected data which is then put into a table and
analyzed. Correlations are made between data, but causation is often not proved. Some also
use regression analysis in order to show more of a causal relationship, but this is not common.
Most of the theories relay the negative effects of brain drain. Most focus on the
negative effects educated emigration can have on education in the origin country, wages in the
origin country, equality in the origin country, and lost investment in educated emigrants.
However, some not the importance of improved networks and lower governmental costs over
time. Are these theories true in the case of Hungary? As mentioned above, Docquier and
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Bhargava (2007) notes that medical brain and brain drain in other scientific fields is normally
significant for developing countries; this is true for Hungary.

Science Brain Drain
An ad hoc committee had been appointed by the Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (MTA),
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, to examine skilled emigration in 1990. The outcome of the
work was published for an academic debate by Hoch, Lovász, Marx, Szelényi, Tamás, Venetianer
and Vizi (1991) warning that Hungarian scientists’ “connection to the World Science is no longer
manifested only in their publications, the traditional way of output, but in their free
international movements as well”. Two successive publications, Anveiler, Tóth and Marton
(1993) and Berényi (1993), concluded that while the migrating scientists are for the most part
of the best quality and the brightest mind, regarding the impact factor of their publications,
they cannot do much unless the tools and financial background of research, especially in
natural and medical sciences, are significantly improved. Berényi (1993) suggests that if
cooperation between Hungarian research institutes and big international centers of research is
improved significantly, the Hungarian researchers may feel less necessary to move abroad and
only travel from one time to another. However, this advice was not utilized, and emigration
rose quickly, particularly due to research and development laws.
Személyi (2011) notes that Hungary is one of the few Eastern European countries to
have a minimum wage since the early 1990s; however, it was this that was then blamed when
many electronic manufacturing companies left Hungary for Romania. However, these
companies did not cite the minimum wage as why. Starting in the mid-1990s the Vice President
of Hungary decided that they should focus on labor intensive manufacturing for the West and
stop innovation. Companies were stripped of their research and development activities as well
as brand names and had to be flexible for contracts. This small step back towards communism
caused workers to have to be flexible as companies quickly came in and out of Hungary. Many
had to take short-term work through short-term contracts or leases. Workers were fired
whenever a production contract expires and hired again when new contracts are in sight. This is
part of why unemployment rose a lot from the early 1990s to early 2000s. Due to increased
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competition in the job market, wages were pushed down. The early 2000s saw a mass exodus
of electronic companies, many of which were the country’s highest employers, from Hungary
due to the restrictions on research and development from high skilled workers and reliance on
low skilled workers for manufacturing. Since leaving, these companies have operated out of
neighboring countries, mainly Slovakia, and created contracts with highly skilled Hungarian
workers to work for them at the lower Slovakian wage rate. Many are forced to accept this due
to the restrictions on R&D in Hungary. Poor labor conditions and wages such as this led to
emigration. Poor wages are also an issue in the healthcare field.
Varga (2016) states that between January 2003 and December 2011, 12% of the
practicing medical doctors left the country, 17% left the domestic health workforce and went to
a job outside the health sector in Hungary, and about 14% became inactive (retired, were
placed on disability pension or child-care pension or became unemployed). Nearly all note that
they emigrated or left the field of medicine for financial reasons. The average wage for a
Hungarian doctor is HUF 547,000 (EUR 1,516) per month which is very low compared to other
EU countries. To remedy this a new law was passed that will increase salaries by 2023 to HUF
687,000 (EUR 1,905) per month. However, the average wages in top destinations for Hungarian
doctors are still much higher than this increased salary. Germany averages 5,416-6,667 EUR per
month, the UK averages 2,559-6,823 EUR per month, Austria averages 3,400-9,000 EUR per
month, Sweden averages 5,025-7,150 EUR per month, and Norway averages 14,408 EUR per
month. Additionally, health spending in Hungary is well below the EU average and continues to
fall behind. WHO (2017) notes that in 2015, Hungary spent EUR 1,428 per capita (7.2% of GDP)
on health care, about half the EU average of EUR 2,797 (9.9% of GDP).
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Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 led to an increased mobility of Hungarian doctors,
who have left in large numbers to work abroad. Between 2004 and 2007 75% of medical
students said they intended to emigrate. This mainly affected the public sector, resulting in a
shortage of health professionals exacerbated by the growing private sector, which is attracting
an increasing number of doctors. Over the last 22 years, 24,828 doctors have left Hungary. This
is the second highest amount in the EU-10. In 2019 there were 33,078 doctors actively working
in Hungary. Since most of these doctors were under the age of 40 when they emigrated, they
are most likely still working. Assuming they are all still working the emigration proportion is
0.4288. Straubhaar (2000) notes that brain drain is significant when the proportion is 0.20 or
higher, therefore medical brain drain in Hungary can be considered significant.
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The UK is the most popular destination for Hungarian doctors. WHO (2019) notes that
15-20 Hungarian doctors every day inquired about work as doctors in the UK. There is a huge
demand for doctors in the UK and in 2005, the first full year that Hungary was in the EU, 160
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doctors emigrated to the UK, most of which were young and starting their careers despite most
of their job descriptions requiring more experience.
Another field experiencing major brain drain in Hungary is the field of natural sciences.
This includes biology, chemistry, physics, and geology. Személyi (2011) found that between
1990 and 2000, approximately 20% of emigrants had degrees in natural sciences. This means
that in the case of natural sciences for every four degrees issued one of them would emigrate
during this time.
The emigration from those in a scientific field constitutes the highest emigration rate
from Hungary. The main reason for this is wages and lack of research and development
opportunities. Whether or not this emigration constitutes a brain drain can be further
examined through data on educated and total emigration as well as factors that may be
affected by high educated emigration rates.

Brain Drain Data
Blaskó conducted a study in 2014 called “Magyarok külföldön – Mennyien? Kik? Hol?
(Hungarians abroad - How many? Who? Where?” with Hungarian citizens aged 20–59 years
who has emigrated after 1989. In this age group there was a sample of 1,198 individuals, and
out of this 618 people emigrated after 2009. In terms of education, those with no more than
lower secondary education represented 6% of the group, while those with higher education
represented far more. Those who attended college accounted for 20% of this group compared
to 12% of the population in Hungary and those who attended university represented 13% of
this group compared to 8% of the population of Hungary. Additionally, the main finding of the
analysis from a labor market perspective is that education is a key factor associated with the
likelihood of emigration. The higher level of education found among emigrants is not caused by
the fact that they come from a younger and more educated population. Even after controlling
for age and other sociodemographic characteristics, it still holds that those with vocational
training or secondary education are two and a half times more likely to emigrate than those
with at most lower secondary education, while graduates of colleges and universities are nearly
five times more likely to emigrate compared to those with at most lower secondary education.
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Education Level of Emigrants

Total vs Tertiary Educated Hungarian Emigrants
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Despite a decrease in the total number of emigrants from 1990-2000, the proportion of
those emigrants there were tertiary educated rose. There was additionally a significant increase
in both the total number of emigrants and total number of educated emigrants in 2015.
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According to Strubhaar (2000) brain drain is considered to be significant if the
proportion of tertiary education emigrants is above 0.20 therefore brain drain in Hungary has
been significant since 1990. From 1990-2000 educated emigration rose slowly. The significant
rises in educated emigration come when Hungary first joins the EU and then again after the
election of Fidesz as the majority party. 2005 is the first full year that Hungary is in the EU
having joined in May 2004. Despite there still being some restrictions on the free movement of
Hungarians in the EU, educated migration surpassed a proportion of .4 for the first time. It is
also the largest increase in proportion in a five-year period to date. Educated emigration still
rises in 2010, but not nearly as large of an increase as in 2005. 2010 is when the Fidesz party
becomes the majority party, and it still is today. Five years later in 2015, educated migration
increases significantly again at nearly the same proportion as from 2000-2005 surpassing .50.
Therefore in 2015 over half of Hungary’s emigrants were tertiary educated. Despite Hungary’s
worsening economics position, most left for political reasons.
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Education Participation & Expenditure

According to KSH (2018), the total number of students pursuing tertiary education in Hungary
has been declining rapidly. Faina (2003) notes that an increasing number of students are deciding to be
educated outside of their country of origin to emigrate sooner and more easily. This can be beneficial to
the government as they can decrease their education expenditures; however, there are less highly
educated people contributing to the economy.

In the case of Hungary according to the World Bank, education expenditure as a percent
of GDP was highest in 1992 at 6.08%, this was a high period of emigration and began dropping

23

significantly in the mid-1990s when emigration slowed. It began rising again in the late 1990s
with a peak in 2003, this was another high emigration period with the numbers of emigrants
increasing yearly, however; it did not end in 2003 but rather 2006. Then an all-time low of
4.16% was hit in 2012, while emigration had been rising at unprecedented levels and hitting
new all-time highs almost yearly since 2010. Since 2014, this rate has hovered around 4.6% with
very little change and remains at 4.6% in 2017 when the data was last available. Additionally, in
2017 it was found that there was a 12% increase from 2016 in Hungarian students pursuing a
tertiary education abroad. Despite increasing emigration and most emigrants being highly
skilled, Hungary has not been increasing their education expenditure during periods of
increasing emigration since the 1990s. This theorized benefit of brain drain in Beine et al.
(2003) and Poutvaara (2004) is not true for Hungary and the increase in Hungarians becoming
educated abroad could be a factor. This is the theory suggested in Faina (2003), since high
levels of Hungarian emigrants are educated abroad then there is no lost investment in
education, but also no incentive for Hungary to invest more in education.

Personal Remittances

In Faina (2003), he argued that high skilled migrants to do not send home any or a lot in
remittances due to their family joining them and a weakening connection to their home country
over time. According to Személyi (2011) Hungary’ data on remittances from high skilled
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migrants supports this. 65% of skilled migrants have sent remittance at least once to family or a
non-profit. The amount is usually $550-5,500 to family and under $550 to organizations. This
usually around 3% or less of their income abroad, or 20% less than their Hungarian income if
they had stayed. These figures are lower if one factors in those who have never sent
remittances to Hungary. Therefore, this benefit of brain drain to Hungary is not substantial as it
has little to no impact on the demand side of the economy. However, remittances from all
emigrants as a percentage of GDP have been rising significantly since 2008 (the global financial
crisis) and only recently leveling out more. So, despite the skill level of emigrants rising,
remittances have risen as well; however, 3% of GDP is not a significant contributor to the
demand side of the economy.

Income Inequality

The Gini Index is the degree of concentration in a country’s income distribution. A Gini
of 0 represents 0 percent concentration in a country’s income distribution. In a country with a
Gini coefficient of 0, everyone receives the same income. A Gini coefficient of 100 represents
100 percent concentration in a country’s income distribution. In a country with a Gini of 100,
one person receives all of the country’s income. Everyone else gets nothing. Neither of these
are realistic. A Gini coefficient of 50 could mean the top 10 percent of a country’s population is
very well-off, the next 50 percent are more or less equal, and the bottom 40 percent very poor.
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50 could also be half have all the money and half have none, but this is not realistic. According
to GINI Index for Hungary (2021), Hungary’s Gini coefficient has fluctuated between 27 and 35
since 2004 but has now leveled off just below 31. The only huge increase was from 2004-2005;
however, 2005-2006 had the highest educated emigration up to that point and income
inequality went down for the next few years. It again increases at end of global financial crisis,
which was also when the Fidesz party rose to power. Despite educated emigration increases
throughout the 2010s, the Gini coefficient has remained pretty static since 2013. This goes
against Miyagiwa (1991) and Docquier (2012), both theories suggest that inequality increases
within a country with high educated emigration rates; however, this is not the case for Hungary.

Networks
According to Személyi (2011) a 2005 study that was replicated in 2008, almost everyone
answered yes to the question “Do you keep in touch with your Hungarian contacts?” Regardless
of years spent abroad, most of them maintained at least 6 contacts. 50% also meet often with
other Hungarians in their current country of residence. Additionally, one in six was maintaining
their status as a member of a Hungarian professional institution in Hungary, but only 5% were
members of a cultural one. When compared to such relations in their current country, we find
that 15% are members of a professional institution in their country of residence and 50% are
members of a cultural institution in their country of residence. It seems common in this group
that professional relations to Hungarian institutions in the country of residence and in the
origin country are equally/more important. At the same time, nation-related cultural needs are
mainly considered as being fulfilled locally. Docquier (2014) notes how origin countries like
Hungary can use the knowledge and ideas of their citizens abroad through diaspora networks.
The data suggests that Hungary’s diaspora networks are strong, and loss of knowledge is not
likely.
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Wages

Hungary has the highest projected wage growth rate in all of the OECD countries. Given
that higher wages are the number one reason for emigration from Hungary, the rising wage
rate is a promising sign that Hungary’s brain drain is improving the wages of those who stay. As
mentioned above, Bhagwati & Hamada (1974) states national income will increase if educated
emigration leads to a rise in wages. This rise in wages could lead to a higher national income for
Hungary, especially if this educated emigration is reducing the cost of education to the
government, and it is shown above education expenditures are declining. This rise in wage rates
is a potential benefit of educated emigration from Hungary; however less Hungarians are
pursuing higher education due to rising wages in all sectors leading to labor market shortages.
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Labor Market Shortages

As shown above, in 2015 nearly 60% of Hungarian firms said they were having trouble
filling job openings. This is the highest amount in Europe. Belyó (2015) states that there were
339,000 jobs seekers in Hungary by the end of 2015. This is a 15.6% decrease from 2014. Only
6% of these job seekers had tertiary education. Additionally, 47% of employers said that had
unfilled positions due to applicants’ lack of necessary skills. This was the highest percentage
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since 2010. A couple of fields that stood out in this study are healthcare and information and
communications technology (ICT). There are several shortages in different fields within
healthcare. As a response the government is working on creating more education and
vocational training funding in infant care and pediatrics, forensic medicine, oxyology,
traumatology, radiology, psychiatry, radiotherapy, pulmonology, infectology, pathology,
neurology, and laboratory diagnostics. In ICT over 10,000 positions unfilled for decades. ICT
contributes to 12% of Hungary’s GDP. This has been expanding 4.5% annually since economic
crisis (2008), but there are not enough skilled employees. Firms in both of these fields as well as
others agreed that most recruitment difficulties come from low wages in Hungary compared to
the rest of the EU, so most skilled workers in Hungary look for work abroad creating labor
market shortages.
The overall proportion of educated emigrants to total emigrants is high and rising and is
thought to have a relationship with all of the factors mentioned above.

Does it Constitute a Brain Drain?
Educated emigration from Hungary does constitute a brain drain by the technical
definition of brain drain: “the departure of educated or professional people from one country,
economic sector, or field for another usually for better pay or living conditions”. This is clearly
occurring in Hungary given that all proportions of educated emigration to total emigration are
above 0.20 and rising, but does this brain drain hurt the economy, help the economy, or
neither?
The main positive of educated emigration for Hungary is their strong networks and
personal remittances. Hungary has strong network connections with their educated emigrants.
50% of Hungarian educated emigrants keep in contact with other Hungarians in their country of
residence and 1 in 6 is still a member of a professional organization in Hungary. This implies
that little knowledge is lost as new ideas from these emigrants are likely to be communicated to
other Hungarians still in Hungary. Additionally, many of these emigrants are sending personal
remittances to Hungary. Personal remittances currently account for 3% of Hungary’s GDP,
which is not a lot but the strong increase if sustained is promising for stimulating a fair amount
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of the demand side of the economy for Hungary. 65% of educated emigrants have at some
point sent personal remittances to Hungary, a high percentage and if sustained even as
emigration rates rise then personal remittances are a promising point of educated emigration
for Hungary.
The main negatives of Hungary’s brain drain are found in labor market shortages,
scientific brain drain, and lowering education levels. The high and rising labor market shortages
have hit a critical level. Low levels of employment in major areas such as healthcare, natural
sciences, and ICT show poor market conditions in Hungary for those educated in science fields.
The main reason for them emigrating is financial gain. Wages are rising in Hungary though in
both educated and uneducated fields. The GINI Index for Hungary is slowly declining showing
that wages for all are becoming more equal. While this may appear to be a positive, less people
are pursuing higher education. This is likely the result of rising wages in fields requiring little to
no education. More Hungarians are not seeing a need for spending on higher education, which
may also explain the lowering levels of education expenditure by the government. The
Hungarian populace is becoming less educated in connection with rising wages from educated
emigration.
While there are benefits that Hungary is experiencing from this brain drain currently,
they are outweighed by the negatives. Hungary’s brain drain overall hurts its economy due to
major educated labor shortages, declining enrollment in higher education, declining education
expenditure, and no real wage raises for educated labor compared to uneducated labor.
Hungary’s brain drain effects and government response has not created an environment that
improves the lives of the educated labor and makes them want to stay in Hungary. There is a
cycle of educated emigrants leaving for financial gain, then average wages rise in all sectors, so
less people become educated, and the ones who do become educated leave since there is no
real increase in wages so there is good financial gain abroad. This cycle causes increasing labor
market shortages. Unless there becomes a stronger financial incentive to stay, helping end the
labor market shortages and education level rise then Hungary’s brain drain will continue.
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